

Equal Graph Partitioning of an Estimated Infection Network

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Motivation

- Social impact of severe respiratory diseases
 - Spanish Flu (1918)
 - 50-100 million deaths
 - SARS (2003)
 - 8273 cases worldwide
 - 775 deaths
 - H5N1 (2005)
 - Pandemic warned
 - H1N1 (2009)
 - 1.6 million cases worldwide
 - 14,378 deaths

Motivation

- Economic impact of severe respiratory diseases
 - SARS (2003)
 - Singapore Airlines
 - S\$4.13B revenue in 2002
 - S\$2.87B revenue in 2003
 - Singapore economy
 - −3% GDP in 2003
 - H1N1 (2009)
 - Economic cost being estimated

Epidemiology

• Biology (10%?)

- Viral pathogen
- Target cells lining respiratory tract
- Viral particles re-emitted in bodily fluid droplets
- Latent phase (~3 days)
 - Already contagious
- Infected phase (~7 days)
 - Symptomatic vs asymptomatic
- Self-limiting through immunological response
 - Immunity period (~1 year) determined by evolution rate of virus

Epidemiology

- Sociology (90%?)
 - Social proximity necessary
 - Inhalation of viral particles
 - High population density
 - Low mixing rates of subpopulations
 - SIR framework does not apply
 - Complex social interactions
 - Co-workers, classmates, social activities
 - Buses, trains, planes, ships
 - Shopping, dining, leisure gatherings

Network Approach

Contact tracing

- SARS (2003)
- H1N1 (2009)

Infection network estimation

- Surveys (Xiao, NTU)
 - Manual, partial
 - No anonymous social interactions
- Cellular phone collocation (Marathe, Virginia Tech)
 - Automatic, total?
 - Inadequate spatial resolution
 - Biological barriers to infection

Our Idea


- Common cold vs rare severe respiratory diseases
 - Biologically very similar
 - Sociologically nearly identical
 - Identical or very similar infection network
- Use common cold incidences to estimate network
 - No-intervention benchmark
 - One epidemic every 2-3 months

Proof of Principle

- Database of incidences
 - Does not exist for common cold
 - Generate from artificial social network
 - Censor data
- Network estimation
 - Tentative links weaken with time
 Real links reinforced periodically
- Network intervention
 - Equal graph partitioning

Artificial Social Network

- Jin, Girvan & Newman, 2001
 - Saturation
 - $k(i) \le k_{\max}$ for all nodes *i*
 - Link formation
 - Randomly select *i* and *j*
 - If k(i), $k(j) < k_{max}$, form link with probability P_0 , if *i* and *j* have no mutual neighbors
 - Else form link with probability $P_1 > P_0$
 - Link deletion
 - Randomly select *i*
 - Delete one random neighbor of *i* with probability Q




SIR Epidemics

- Epidemic
 - At t = 0, all nodes susceptible (S)
 - At t = 1, one random node infected (I)
 - At each t > 1, susceptible neighbors of infected nodes infected with probability p
 - Each infected node recovers (R) after $t_R = 1$ time step

Censorship

- List of infected nodes at each t
- Only fraction f < 1 used for estimation
 - Simulate low level of reporting



Network Estimation

Link Formation

- Tentative link
 - between ALL reported nodes at time step t and ALL reported nodes at time step t – 1
 - Weight w = 1
- Link Reinforcement
 - Over S epidemics
 - False links formed once or twice
 - Real links formed O(S) times
- Link Elimination
 - Weights of ALL links decay at constant rate
 - Help keep background of false links low

S = 100

f = 0.3


- Not estimated
 Correct
 Wrong
- n242 0 m78 (Ins) n291()1 n31


backbone of infection network

Network Intervention

- Nested Dissection (Lipton, 1979)
 - Efficient solution of sparse linear systems
- Equal Graph Partitioning (Chen, 2008)
 - Efficient immunization of completely mapped complex network
- Our question
 - Will EGP be effective:
 - Partially mapped network?
 - Errors in mapped network?
 - Epidemic in progress?

Equal Graph Partitioning






Systematic Study

- Estimation accuracy vs
 - Number of estimated links
 - *N* = 10k; *<k>* = 10; *c* = 0.05
 - Censor rate (1 f)
 - *N* = 10k; *<k>* = 10; *c* = 0.05
 - Number of epidemics \mathcal{S}
 - *N* = 10k; *<k>* = 10; *c* = 0.05
 - Network sizes
 - *N* = 1k, 10k, 100k; *<k>* = 10; *c* = 0.05
 - Average degree <k>
 - *N* = 10k; *<k>* = 10, 20; *c* = 0.05


Number of Estimated Links




60%

80%


Censor Rate




Number of Epidemics



Network Sizes




Average Degree




Depressing?

- Low accuracy for high censor rate
- Every order of magnitude increase in *N*
 - Accuracy halves
- Doubling of <k>
 - Accuracy quarters
- How to reliably estimate $N = 10^6$ network?
 - Encourage self reporting through online portal
 - <k> finite even in large cities
 - Combine information from cellular phone collocation

Pre-Epidemic EGP Intervention



In-Progress EGP Intervention



Conclusions

- Estimation of infection network through censored incidence data alone
 - SIR epidemics on artificial social network
 - Decay-reinforcement link estimation
- Infection network partially estimated
 - Asymptotic perfect accuracy possible
 - Accuracy decreases with increasing N and <k>
- EGP intervention surprisingly effective
 - Concentration of estimated links along infection backbone
 - Effective even when applied late into epidemic

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Thank You!