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wine11

Singapore Esplanade

Schedule

Sunday, Dec 11 (NTU campus)
08:45Bus departs from Novotel to NTU campus
09:30–11:00Bayesian Mechanism Design, part I (Jason Hartline)
11:00–11:20Coffee break
11:20–12:50Bayesian Mechanism Design, part II (Jason Hartline)
12:50–14:00Lunch (provided)
14:00–15:30Contagion in Social Networks, part I (Nicole Immorlica, Amin Saberi)
15:30–15:50Coffee break
15:50–17:20Contagion in Social Networks, part II (Nicole Immorlica, Amin Saberi)
17:40Bus departs from NTU campus to Novotel
18:30–20:00Reception (Novotel)
Monday, Dec 12 (Novotel)
09:00–09:10Opening
09:10–10:10Lipschitz Mappings, Differential Privacy, and Fairness Through Awareness (Cynthia Dwork)
10:10–10:30Coffee break
10:30–11:30Session 1
» Maria-Florina Balcan, Florin Constantin and Steven Ehrlich.
The Snowball Effect of Uncertainty in Potential Games.
» Po-An Chen, Bart De Keijzer, David Kempe and Guido Schaefer.
On the Robust Price of Anarchy of Altruistic Games.
» Russell Buehler, Zachary Goldman, David Liben-Nowell, Yuechao Pei, Jamie Quadri, Alexa Sharp, Sam Taggart, Tom Wexler and Kevin Woods.
The Price of Civil Society.
11:30–11:40Short break
11:40–12:20Session 2
» Ioannis Caragiannis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas and Ariel Procaccia.
An Improved 2-Agent Kidney Exchange Mechanism.
» Morteza Zadimoghaddam, Vahab Mirrokni and Bernhard Haeupler.
Online Stochastic Weighted Matching: Improved Approximation Algorithms.
12:20–13:40Lunch (Novotel)
13:40–15:00Session 3
» Constantinos Daskalakis and George Pierrakos.
Simple, Optimal and Efficient Auctions.
» Nikhil Devanur, Jason Hartline, Anna Karlin and Thach Nguyen.
A Prior-Independent Mechanism for Profit Maximization in Unit-demand Combinatorial Auctions.
» Xue Chen, Guangda Hu, Pinyan Lu and Lei Wang.
On the Approximation Ratio of k-lookahead Auction.
» Sanjiv Kapoor.
Buy-Sell Auction Mechanisms in Market Equilibrium.
15:00–15:30Coffee break
15:30–16:50Session 4
» George Christodoulou and Annamaria Kovacs.
A Global Characterization of Envy-free Truthful Scheduling of Two Tasks.
» Ron Lavi and Marina May.
A Note on the Incompatibility of Strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in Quasi-linear Settings with Public Budgets.
» Mingyu Guo, Victor Naroditskiy, Vincent Conitzer and Amy Greenwald.
Budget-Balanced and Nearly Efficient Randomized Mechanisms: Public Goods and Beyond.
» Angelina Vidali.
Extending characterizations of truthful mechanisms from subdomains to domains.
Tuesday, December 13 (Novotel)
09:00–10:00The Bipartite Rationing Problem (Herve Moulin)
10:00–10:30Coffee break
10:30–11:30Session 5
» Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir and Moshe Tennenholtz.
Revenue Enhancement in Ad Auctions.
» Quang Duong and Sebastien Lahaie.
Discrete Choice Models of Bidder Behavior in Sponsored Search.
» Sebastien Lahaie and Preston Mcafee.
Efficient Ranking in Sponsored Search.
11:30–11:40Short break
11:40–12:20Session 6
» Yiling Chen, Ian Kash, Mike Ruberry and Victor Shnayder.
Decision Markets With Good Incentives.
» Abraham Othman and Tuomas Sandholm.
Liquidity-Sensitive Automated Market Makers via Homogeneous Risk Measures.
12:20–13:40Lunch (Novotel)
13:40–15:00Session 7
» George Mertzios, Sotiris Nikoletseas, Christoforos Raptopoulos and Paul Spirakis.
Natural Models for Evolution on Networks.
» Michael Kearns, Stephen Judd and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik.
Behavioral Conflict and Fairness in Social Networks.
» Rafael Frongillo, Grant Schoenebeck and Omer Tamuz.
Social Learning in a Changing World.
» Jing He, Hongyu Liang and Hao Yuan.
Controlling Infection by Blocking Nodes and Links Simultaneously.
15:00–15:30Coffee break
15:30–16:50Session 8
» Wei Chen, Pinyan Lu, Xiaorui Sun, Bo Tang, Yajun Wang and Zeyuan Allen Zhu.
Optimal Pricing in Social Networks with Incomplete Information.
» Christian Borgs, Ozan Candogan, Jennifer Chayes, Ilan Lobel and Hamid Nazerzadeh.
Optimal Multi-Period Pricing with Service Guarantees.
» Ben Edelman and Michael Schwarz.
Pricing and Efficiency in the Market for IP Addresses.
» Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan and Svetlana Olonetsky.
Truth, Envy, and Truthful Market Clearing Bundle Pricing.
19:00–21:00Conference dinner (location to be announced)
Wednesday, Dec 14 (Novotel)
09:00–10:00Economics and Machine Learning (Preston McAfee)
10:00–10:30Coffee break
10:30–11:30Session 9
» Sayan Bhattacharya, Janardhan Kulkarni, Kamesh Munagala and Xiaoming Xu.
On Allocations with Negative Externalities.
» Evangelos Markakis and Christos-Alexandros Psomas.
On Worst-Case Allocations in the Presence of Indivisible Goods.
» Li Han, Chunzhi Su, Linpeng Tang and Hongyang Zhang.
On Strategy-proof Allocation without Payments or Priors.
11:30–11:40Coffee break
11:40–12:20Session 10
» Isabelle Stanton and Virginia Vassilevska Williams.
Manipulating Stochastically Generated Single-Elimination Tournaments for Nearly All Players.
» Michael Zuckerman, Piotr Faliszewski, Vincent Conitzer and Jeffrey Rosenschein.
An NTU Cooperative Game Theoretic View of Manipulating Elections.
12:20–13:40Lunch (Novotel)
13:40–15:00Session 11
» David Thompson, Samantha Leung and Kevin Leyton-Brown.
Computing Nash Equilibria of Action-Graph Games via Support Enumeration.
» Albert Xin Jiang and Kevin Leyton-Brown.
A General Framework for Computing Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Compact Games.
» Jugal Garg, Albert Jiang and Ruta Mehta.
Bilinear Games: Polynomial Time Algorithms for Rank Based Subclasses.
» Tobias Harks and Max Klimm.
Demand Allocation Games: Integrating Discrete and Continuous Strategy Spaces.
15:00–15:30Coffee break
15:30–16:50Session 12
» Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer and Kamesh Munagala.
Approximation Algorithm for Security Games with Costly Resources.
» Frederic Magniez, Michel De Rougemont, Miklos Santha and Xavier Zeitoun.
The complexity of approximate Nash equilibrium in congestion games with negative delays.
» Yu Wu, Loc Bui and Ramesh Johari.
Heavy Traffic Approximation of Equilibria in Resource Sharing Games.
» Ilan Nehama.
Approximate Judgement Aggregation.
End of the program